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KENTUcKY LAW JoURNAL
if he saw it. The guilty party is the acting tenant, who is fully cogni-
zant of his acts and their consequences, and should be held to ac-
count for them accordingly.
Roger M. Oliver
ADAmSTRATIvE LAw-ZoNNG-APPEAL FRom Zornwc BoARD DECISioNs.
-Petition to the Louisville and Jefferson County Planning and Zoning
Commission asking a zone change from residential to business for a
shopping center denied as contra the master zoning plan. At the
hearing evidence was introduced to show: other commercial develop-
ments in the area, no objection from residents of the area, no detri-
ment would accrue to the surrounding area, and a community ad-
vantage would result.
Applicant appealed to Jefferson Circuit Court pursuant to KRS
100.057(2), which provides: ". . . Hearings in the Circuit Court shall
be de novo. .. ." The circuit court upheld the commission and found
that the decision was neither arbitrary nor unreasonable and, in hear-
ing the evidence, that there was no tenable basis for re-classifying
the property.
Applicant appealed, contending that the circuit court erred in
placing the burden of proof on him. Held: Afinned. The trial court
merely set the order of introduction of proof as authorized by CR
48.02(3), and did not place the burden on applicant. American Beauty
Homes Corp. v. Louisville and Jefferson County Planning and Zoning
Commission, 379 S.W. 2d 450 (Ky. 1964). This holding has little
significance, but the court did not stop there. The court went on to
consider the constitutionality of KRS 100.057(2) and purported to
hold the statute unconstitutional because of the provision for a de
novo hearing in circuit court. The court found that the section violated
the Kentucky Constitution, Sec. 27.1 The court stated:
2
In order that the independence of the three distinct departments of
government be preserved, it is a fundamental principle that the legis-
lature cannot invade the province of the judiciary . . . nor may it im-
pose on the judiciary nonjudiciary duties.
The court reasoned that the legislature, in providing for a de novo
hearing, attempted to confer upon the judiciary the identical duties
1 "The powers of the government of the Commonwealth of Kentucky shall
be divided into three distinct departments, and each of them be confined to a
separate body of magistracy, to-wit: those which are legislative, to one; those
which are executive, to another; and those which are judicial, to another."
2 379 S.W.2d 450 at 453.
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and powers of the commission and thus turn the judiciary into a
legislative policy making organ. This function, said the court, calls
for policy decisions by a body which specialized training and experi-
ence in this field.
It is questionable whether this case can be said to hold precisely
what the Court of Appeals purports to hold because at best it is a
multi-leg decision, and a simple affirmance of the circuit court de-
cision does not require a decision on the constitutional question.
If the court is only affirming that part of the circuit court action
which was an appeal from the board's action on constitutional grounds,
then the Court of Appeals may be denying applicant due process.
If he relied on the statute3 in bringing his case to circuit court, then
he probably proceeded mainly on the basis of a de novo hearing of the
evidence with less emphasis on the constitutional grounds for appeal
than would otherwise be the case. Had the Court of Appeals so in-
tended they would likely have reversed the circuit court's action in
hearing the case de novo and remand it for hearing on appeal as to
the constitutional issues. However, there is little doubt that in a
future proper case the Court of Appeals will follow what it purports to
hold in this case.
The question then arises as to what grounds are left for appeal
from an adverse zoning commission ruling. In the principal case the
court gives what it conceives to be the valid grounds for judicial
review: 4 "Basically, judicial review of administrative action is con-
cerned with the question of arbitrariness."
Defining arbitrariness the court refers to three grounds:5
(1) Action in excess of granted powers.
(2) Lack of procedural due process.
(3) Lack of substantial evidentiary support.
To define these grounds we will analyze the cases cited by the court
in illustration of each proposition.
Action in Excess of Granted Powers
In Henry v. Parrish6 the Jefferson County Board of Health at-
tempted to collect permit fees from restaurant owners to defray the
cost of health inspections. The reasonableness of the fee was not in
issue. The board contended that the power to regulate health matters
carries with it the incidental power to make charges to defray the
3 Ky. Rev. Stat. § 100.057(2) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
4 379 S.W.2d 450 at 456.
lIbid.
6 307 Ky. 559, 211 S.W.2d 418 (Ky. 1948).
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cost. In affirming the issuance of an injunction against collection
the court made the following points:
1. The board differs from a city government which may impose
fees as an inherent adjunct to its police power. The board is created
by the legislature to exercise a particular power of the legislature
and the limit of the board's power is the particular power as delegated.
Any doubt is strictly construed against the board.
2. Since the statute creating the Board of Health 7 provides for
financing the board's operations from a county and city tax fund8
it shows a legislative intent that the board not do its own fund raising.
Thus we may conclude that the courts will not by judicial con-
struction of a statute enhance the power of an administrative agency
to do things incidental to the performance of its function. Agencies
have no inherent powers and must therefore apply to the legislature
for any powers needed.
Lack of Procedural Due Process
In Kentucky Alcoholic Beverage Control Board v. Jacobs9 the board
cited defendant for permitting a fugitive from the law to enter his
premises. After a hearing, the board revoked defendant's liquor
license and ordered that the premises be padlocked until the follow-
ing June pursuant to a statute' l which provided that the board shall
have the power ".... to close, lock, and bar.., any premises in viola-
tion of KRS Chapter 241." The court held the statute1 unconsti-
tutional because there was no requirement in the statute that the board
make a finding that a nuisance exists before ordering the promises
padlocked. Since the premises would be closed not only for alcoholic
beverage purposes but for all purposes it would amount to a taking
of property without due process.
The statute in question did not deny a hearing and the court pre-
sumed that in most cases a fair hearing would be given. The only
objection which rendered the statute unconstitutional was that it did
not require a hearing to determine the nuisance issue. We may there-
fore conclude that statutes conferring authority on administrative
agencies to deny the use of private property must explicitly provide
for hearings and determinations of fact so as to assure procedural
due process.
7KRS ch. 212.
8KBS 212.470.
9 269 S.W.2d 189 (Ky. 1954).
10KRS 241.060(6).
11 Ibid.
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Lack of Substantial Evidenciary Support
In Thurman v. Meridian Mutual Insurance Co.,12 the plaintiff
insurance company filed a petition with the Insurance Commissioner
asking that it be permitted to set fire insurance rates lower than those
set by the Kentucky Rating Bureau. The Commissioner has authority
to allow such dowvnward rate deviations' 3 if he finds the resulting
premiums would not be "excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discrim-
inatory." The applicant previously had a profitable auto insurance
business for many years but was relatively new in the fire insurance
line. In other states similar deviations were allowed to the company.
The Kentucky Commissioner had also allowed deviations for the years
1955-1957. Operating profit on fire insurance in Kentucky for the
company had dropped during the years in question. It was con-
tended that the reduced profits would not continue once the fire in-
surance business was fully established because its lower rates would
attract a larger number of applicants, permitting it to select its risks
and thus achieve a lower loss factor.
The Commissioner denied the application, finding that the com-
pany's solvency would be jeopardized by the rate reduction and
that the company's nationwide experience with the reduced rates did
not justify granting the deviation. On appeal the circuit court set
aside the Commissioner's ruling and ordered the reduction. The Court
of Appeals reversed and reinstated the Commissioner's ruling, holding
that the Commissioner's findings are conclusive if founded on "sub-
stantial evidence." In defining "substantial evidence" the court said:14
Returning now to the permissible scope of judicial review, bear in mind
that the scope of discretionary power by the Commissioner, though
resting ultimately on opinion as distinguished from pure fact, repre-
sents a factual finding and is not to be disturbed unless it is arbitrary
or unreasonable. By 'arbitrary' we mean clearly erroneous, and by
'clearly erroneous' we mean unsupported by substantial evidence. By
'unreasonable' is meant that under the evidence presented there is no
room for difference of opinion among reasonable minds.
What the court appears to be saying is that in a field requiring
expert knowledge the court will treat the opinion of an administra-
tive agency as a finding of fact and not reviewable if (1) substan-
tial evidence has been heard, and (2) reasonable men could differ.
By equating "clearly erroneous" with "unsupported by substantial
12345 S.W.2d 635 (Ky. 1961).
13 KRS 304.606.
14 345 S.W.2d 635 at 639.
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evidence" the court leaves a possibility, however, for review of the
agency's opinion.
In conclusion, there will probably not be any more cases in which
the circuit court judge makes a trip to the property to determine if
it would be a good place to have a shopping center.'5 Permissible
scope of judicial review will be on the basis of:
1. Action in excess of granted powers with a presumption of a
lack of any power not explicitly enumerated by the legislature.
2. Lack of procedural due process with a requirement that the
statute itself enumerate a procedure which meets the standards
of due process quite apart from whether due process was in
fact achieved in the case.
3. Lack of substantial evidentiary support, i.e., whether evidence
was heard and whether there is any evidence to support the
finding, or whether a reasonable man could reach the same
conclusion.
It is submitted that this will make zoning board rulings extremely
difficult, if not impossible, to overturn. This is regrettable since it
grants power to effectively take the most profitable uses of private
property without the judicial restraint which the legislature intended
when it enacted the KRS 100.057 de novo provision. Hopefully, when
the proper case arises, the court will construe review on the "clearly
erroneous" question to permit some latitude of judgment as to the
weight of the evidence presented to the board.
Courtney F. Ellis
TOTs-I i r v'ENwG CAusE-FonxsABrY.- The plaintiff sustained
injuries when she fell through a trap door left open by a tenant in
the unlighted hallway of a building. The plaintiff claimed that the
negligence of the defendant, the owner of the building, in failing to
light the passageway, was a concurring proximate cause of her in-
juries. Held: Judgment for the plaintiff was reversed with directions
that the defendant be given a judgment n. o. v. "Granted that appel-
lant may have been negligent in failing to keep the passageway
lighted, the independent act of negligence by the tenant, without
which the accident could not have occurred, was an act the appellant
15 Louisville and Jefferson County Planning and Zoning Coznm'n v. Cope,
318 S.W.2d 842 (Ky. 1958).
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